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Abstract
This paper analyses the e¤ects of reducing unfunded social security and popu-
lation ageing on economic growth and welfare, both for a small open economy
and for a closed economy. The economy consists of a service sector and a
commodity sector. Productivity growth only occurs in the latter sector and is
assumed to depend positively on its size. It is shown that if old agents mainly
demand labour intensiveservices, a decreaseofthepay-as-you-go (PAYG) pen-
sion scheme reduces long-run growth and thuswelfare in a small open economy,
whereas current generations are better o¤. However, reducing social security
raises productivity growth in a closed economy, both in theshort and long run.
Furthermore, ageing will lead to a lower long-run rate of economic growth
in a small open economy, whereas in the short run, the e¤ects depend on the
type of ageing and the size of the PAYG-scheme. In a closed economy, the
e¤ects of ageing depend on the substitutability of labour and capital.
JEL classi…cation: D91, E60, H55, J14, O41
Keywords: endogenous growth, overlapping generations, pensions, population
ageing, privatisation, social security reform
¤Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg,
The Netherlands. Email: groezen@kub.nl. The authors bene…ted from discussions with and sug-
gestions from Jan Boone, Lans Bovenberg and Sjak Smulders. The usual disclaimer applies.1 Introduction
Analyses on the sustainability of current social security arrangements are usually
based on a comparison of the rates of return of both funded and unfunded schemes.
This basically leads to the conclusion that as long as the economy is dynamically
e¢cient, a public pension and health care scheme that is …nanced on a pay-as-you-go
(PAYG)-basis is harmful for future generations, in the sense that they would gain
from a switch to more funded schemes. This would even hold more if the population
ages, since this deteriorates the internal rate of return of an unfunded scheme. An
important aspect in this context that is often neglected is the e¤ect of social security
reform and population ageing on economic growth, and thereby on the well-being of
current and future generations, which is the focus of this paper.
Conventional analyses on the relation between social security and growth focus
on the impact of a PAYG-scheme on savings. As was demonstrated in e.g. Feld-
stein (1974), Kotliko¤ and Summers (1981) and Modigliani (1988), transfers from
the young to the old, such as unfunded social security, discourage private savings,
resulting in less capital accumulation and a lower output level (see also e.g. Kotliko¤,
1979, and Jones and Manuelli, 1992). However, these analyses do not explicitly model
technological progress. If productivity growth is modeled by assuming an externality
in production as in Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), where production is charac-
terised by constant returns to scale at the aggregate level, unfunded social security
will decrease the rate of economic growth, see King andRebelo (1990), Rebelo(1991),
Saint-Paul (1992) and Wiedmer (1996).1 But if economic growth rather results from
the accumulation of human capital (as initiated by Uzawa, 1965, and Lucas, 1988),
the e¤ect of PAYG-pension schemes on growth may be positive, as is for instance
demonstrated in Sala-i-Martin (1996), Kemnitz (2000), Kemnitz and Wigger (2000)
and Sánchez-Losada (2000).
As to the e¤ects of ageing, the neo-classical growth model with an exogenous
saving rate predicts that a declining population growth would have a positive e¤ect
on the growth rate of output per capita, since the number of people that share the
capital stock decreases. In Futagami and Nakajima (2001), who apply a model with
external e¤ects of the aggregate capital stock on productivity, it is found that the
e¤ect of a longer life span on economic growth is unambiguously positive. On the
1In that case, a Pareto-improving transition to a more funded scheme is possible, see Belan et
al. (1998), Corneo and Marquardt (2000) and Gyárfás and Marquardt (2001).
1other hand, Pecchenino and Pollard (1997), who consider a similar growth model,
show that a longer life span can decrease economic growth, depending on the extent
to which all wealth is annuitised. Another channel through which population ageing
can a¤ect economic growth is the formation of human capital, as in Kemnitz (2000)
and Pecchenino and Utendorf (1999), where ageing has a positive e¤ect on growth.
Not much empirical work has been done on the relation between ageing and
growth. Disney (1996, Chapter 8) …nds a clear negative relationship between the
old-age dependency ratio and the GDP growth rate for 24 OECD countries between
1977 and 1992. Also Lindh and Malmberg (1999) found that the growth pattern of
GDP per worker in the OECD countries between 1950 and 1990 are to a large extent
explained by age structure changes. In particular, they too …nd a strong negative
correlation between growth and the population share of old-age people.
Inthis paper, we focus onanother mechanism throughwhichsocial securityreform
and ageing can a¤ect economic growth. We extend the two-sector model presented in
Groezen et al. (2002) by including endogenously determined economic growth, and
concentrate on the e¤ects of privatisation2 and population ageing with respect to the
sectoral structure of the economy, and on economic growth for di¤erent degrees of
openness of the economy. Our approach closely follows Baumol (1967), who groups
economic activities into two types: “technologically progressive activities in which
innovations, capital accumulation, and economies of large scale all make for a cumu-
lative rise in output per man hour and activities which, by their very nature, permit
only sporadic increases in productivity.” (Baumol, 1967, p. 415-16). As to the …rst
type of activity, “labor is primarily an instrument”, whereas the second type consists
of “services in which the labor is an end in itself, in which quality is judged directly
in terms of amount of labor.” So again, we assume two sectors: a labour-intensive
service sector and a capital intensive commodity sector. Productivity growth is en-
dogenously determined and mainly stems from technological progress that typically
takes place in the commodity (or ‘high-tech’) sector. As productivity grows, wages
paid in this sector also increase. Because labour is assumed to be mobile between
both sectors, the wage paid in the services sector will grow equally fast.
The capital-intensive sector produces homogeneous consumption and investment
commodities that are demanded by young individuals, whereas elderly derive util-
ity from labour-intensive services. Consequently, a change in the intergenerational
2By privatisation we mean a simultaneous reduction of the unfunded part of social security (i.e.,
a lower PAYG-tax) and an extension of the funded part (i.e., higher private savings).
2redistribution anddemographic composition of theeconomy will a¤ect therelativeag-
gregate demand for services and commodities. The structure of the economy, thereby
the growth rate and the well-being of successive generations, are thus in‡uenced.
We …nd that the e¤ects of privatisating social security crucially depend on the
openness of the economy. In a small open economy that faces an exogenously given
interest rate (that exceeds the rate of economic growth), the short-run e¤ects di¤er
from the long-run consequences. Initially, privatisation immediately decreases the
demand for services by the old and thus leads to a higher concentration of labour in
the productive sector, which stimulates economic growth. In the long run, however,
privatising social security increases the lifetime income of generations born at or just
after the time of the decrease in the PAYG-tax. This stimulates their demand for
both services and commodities. As services cannot be imported, this implies that
more labour will be employed in the services sector and the domestic production of
commodities is reduced. Consequently, economic growth is eventually lower than it
would have been without privatisation, putting future generations at a disadvantage.
On the other hand, if the economy is closed, the interest rate is endogenously
determined by the interaction of savings and investments. In the short run, privati-
sation reduces the income of the current old and thereby increases the employment in
the commodity sector, whichimplies a higher growth rate. In the long run, theoverall
demand for both commodities and services increases. Because labour is employed in
both sectors, and capital only in one, labour becomes relatively more scarce so that
wages increase, and thereby the price of services. This reduces the demand for ser-
vices, thus stimulating productivity growth in the commodity sector. Furthermore,
reducing an unfunded social security scheme increases savings and the capital stock,
which attracts employees to the commodity sector as they can earn a higher wage.
So also in the long run, growth is stimulated by privatisation in a closed economy.
The second part deals with the e¤ects of ageing, modeled as a permanently higher
averagelifetime. Itturns out thatina small openeconomy, populationageing leads to
a lower long-run rate of economic growth because the increase in the relative number
of old implies a lower domestic production of commodities. In the short run, ageing
has no e¤ects on the labour share of the productive sector.
In a closed economy, the capital-labour ratio will also be in‡uenced by domestic
demographic changes and consequently play an important role. The long-run e¤ects
of ageing then crucially depend on the extent to which capital and labour are substi-
tutable in the production process of commodities. If they are substitutes, then ageing
3will decrease growth, whereas the reverse holds if capital andlabour are complements.
Again, ageing has no e¤ect in the short run.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In
Section3, we analyse both the long-run and short-runconsequences of downsizingthe
unfunded social security scheme. Section 4 analyses the consequences of increasing
longevity. In Section 5 we discuss some extensions and modi…cations of the model.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Production of commodities and services
Two sectors of production are distinguished, both consisting of many suppliers who
take prices as given. In the commodity sector (labelled Y), homogeneous goods are
produced that either serve as consumption or investment good and can be traded
internationally. The production process involves the employment of both physical
capital and labour according to the following standard neoclassical CRTS production
function: Yt = F(Kt;AtLY
t ), where Kt stands for the domestic capital stock, LY
t is
the number of people employed in the commodity sector and At is a productivity
parameter re‡ecting the current state of (technological) knowledge or experience in
the economy (all at time t). At can therefore be interpreted as the average human
capital and AtLY
t as the total human capital employed in the commodity sector.




the e¤ective capital-labour ratio. The elasticity of substitution between capital and
labour is thus de…ned as ¾ ´ ¡
f0(·)(f(·)¡f0(·)·)
f00(·)f(·)· . Firms maximise their pro…ts, so
the interest and wage rate are given by rt = f0(·t) and wt = At(f(·t)¡ f0(·t)·t)
respectively.
The productivity of an employee in the commodity sector, At, grows at the en-
dogenous rate g,3 which is assumed to depend positively on the number of people
3It may well be that the economy also adopts new technologies and increases its knowledge from
abroad. In that case, the size of the commodity sector positively a¤ects the additional productivity
growth of the economy.







This is a shortcut for explicitly modeling (labour-intensive) R&D activities or educa-
tion. Basically, one could assume that part of the employees in the commodity sector
devote their time on these activities, so the more people that are active in this sector
of the economy, the more knowledge is created and skills are improved, which allows
people to produce more …nal output, i.e., productivity increases (as in e.g. Romer,
1990, Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1993).
The service sector concerns the provision of labour-intensive services (labelled D)
that do not use capital goods, and do not bene…t from technological improvements.5
This sector uses labour only, assuming that one unit of labour translates into one
service.6 Since international trade in services is not possible and labour is assumed to
be immobile across borders, the total provision of services equals total labour supply
in this sector (LD
t ). The price of services in terms of commodities, pt, is therefore
equal to the wage rate in this sector. As we shall assume labour to be homogeneous
and the labour market to be competitive, this wage is equal to the wage paid in the
other sector, so pt = wt.
Households
The economy is inhabitedby N individuals who livefor twoperiods, such that in each
period, both a young and anoldgeneration are alive.7 For notational convenience, we
set N equal to unity. Apart from age, people are identical. Every young individual
faces a probability of " to grow old, so 1¡" is the fraction of young that dies after one
4Note that we assume A to grow instantly with the size of the sector. If learning takes time,
however, one would rather want to assume some delay in the accumulation of knowledge. However,
assuming that g is a function of LY
t¡1 instead of LY
t would imply that learning takes about 30 years
(i.e., one period in our model), which does not seem to be very realistic.
5Examples are nurses, GPs, gardeners, cleaners, housekeepers, hairdressers, butlers, theatre seats
and hotel rooms. Note that these are not services like bank services which extensively use high-tech
goods like computers.
6Another interpretation would be that the quality of services increases with the number of em-
ployees.
7This size is assumed tobe constant. Section 5 investigates the e¤ects of changes in the population
growth rate,
5periodof life.8 Whenpeople growold, the need for services increases, both because of
increased disability (which raises the demand for e.g. care services and housekeeping
assistance) and a higher preference for services relative to (high-tech) commodities.9
To simplify the analysis, we will assume old individuals to demand services only. The
expected lifetime utility of a representative agent born at any time t can then be
represented by the following function,
EtU(ct;d
o
t+1) = logct + °"t+1logdt+1; (2)
where ct stands for the consumption of commodities when young and dt+1 is the
number of services enjoyed by the agent when old.10
Every young individual supplies one unit of labour inelastically and receives wage.
A fraction ¿t of his labour income is taxed by the government to …nance a public
pension scheme. The young spend their net income on the purchase of commodities,
either for consumption or investment purposes (i.e., savings, st). Savings are invested
in annuities or through an actuarially fair pension fund. As only a fraction "t+1 of
young savers born at time t survives to period t+1, the assets of those who deceased
fall to surviving contemporaries. The total return on the savings is therefore
rt+1
"t+1.
Furthermore, the public pension bene…t that an old individual at time t+ 1 receives
is equal to
¿t+1wt+1
"t+1 . The social security tax is constant (or in case of privatisation,
reduced to a lower constant level), so that the bene…t level adjusts.11 Individual
consumption possibilities are thus given by the following budget constraints,





where pt is the price of services in terms of commodities. Maximising (2) subject to
8We can interpret " as the fraction of the second period of life that people live, i.e., average
longevity. An increase of " is thus referred to as a longer lifespan (one form of population ageing).
9Because innovation mainly takes place in the commodity sector, the varieties of high-tech com-
modities constantly change. As older people have more di¢culties learning how to apply these
new technologies and/or products, this can also explain why they would have a relatively higher
preference for services.
10Allowing for consumption of services when young does not qualitatively a¤ect the results of
reducing the social security tax and increasing longevity. However, the results can change if ageing
is the result of a lower fertility rate. See Subsection 5.2.
11In Subsection 5.3 we examine the case of a constant bene…t level.






















Note that the consumption of commodities is growing over time with the rate of eco-
nomicgrowth. But fora givengrowthrate, the number ofservices enjoyed is constant,
since the (positive) income e¤ect of a rising wage is exactly o¤set by the (negative)
substitution e¤ect of higher prices of services. This is a necessary requirement for an
equilibrium to exist, because the supply of labour, and thus the provision of services,
is limited.12;13 Furthermore, for a given interest rate, a higher growth rate decreases
the number of services for an old person.
Finally, four assumptions are made throughout the paper (see Appendix for fur-
ther details).
Assumption I The growth function g is such that a steady state exists.
Assumption II LY converges to a steady state, i.e., the equilibrium is asymptotically
stable.





Assumption IV The set of parameter values is such that the economy is always
dynamically e¢cient, i.e., rt > 1+ g(LY
t ) 8t.
12This is in line with the modelling of the labour/leisure choice in a model with economic growth,
where the number of leisure hours cannot grow inde…nitely. King et al. (1988) and Rebelo (1991)
formulate the kind of utility function for which this holds (see also Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995,
Chapter 9). The log-linear utility function applied here is a special case of this type of utility
function.
13Instead of putting restrictions on the utility function in order to prevent corner solutions, one
could also assume that the services sector experiences exogenous growth equal to ¹ gS, and growth
in the commodity sector is partly exogenous, ¹ gY , and partly endogenous, g(LY ). In that case, it
must be assumed that the di¤erence in exogenous growth rates is ultimately compensated by the
endogenously determined productivity di¤erence. The share of labour employed in the commodity
sector then equals LY = g¡1(¹ gS ¡ ¹ gY ) in the long run, in which case privatisation does not a¤ect
the growth rate in the long run.
7According to Assumption III, endogenous-growth e¤ects are not very strong. This
assumption is necessary in order to assure that (second-order) price e¤ects that are
the result of a change in LY do not dominate the direct (…rst-order) e¤ects of a
shock.14 Assumption IV states that the economy is dynamically e¢cient, both before
and after the economy is hit by a shock. So if a reduction of the social security
implies a lower level of utility, this is because the economy has become dynamically
ine¢cient.
3 Privatising social security
This section investigates the consequences of reducing the unfunded social security
scheme in the economy described above. The …rst part deals with the case of a small
open economy, whereas the second part focuses on a closed economy. The probability
to grow old is set equal to unity (" = 1).
3.1 Privatisation in a small open economy
In a small open economy with perfect capital mobility, the interest rate is determined
at the world capital market. If this rate is constant and equal to r, the e¤ective
capital-labour ratio is also constant and equal to · = f¡1(r). Consequently, wages
grow at the rate g. In case of dynamic e¢ciency (r > 1+g), the interest rate exceeds
the growth rate and funding yields a higher return than a PAYG-scheme. If the
growth rate is also exogenously given, current young and future generations would
be better o¤ if the social security tax were reduced. This section examines whether
this also holds in the two-sector model as described above.
Four markets can be distinguished. First, because services are not tradable, the
total demand has to be met by domestic labour supply, so LD
t = dt. Labour market
clearing implies that the remaining young are employed in the commodity sector:
LY
t = 1¡LD
t . Together with (6), this implicitly gives thedynamics of the employment















14Simulations for the case that gt = ¹ g + ½LY
t show that this assumption indeed holds for a wide
range of parameter values.
8Any excess demand (supply) of commodities will be imported (exported) from (to)
abroad, and be equal to the di¤erence between domestic savings and investments.
Note that the current state of the economy, as summarised by (8), is not related to
its past. The e¤ects of a change in the social security tax can be traced by linearising
(8) around the initial steady state. In case the small open economy is unexpectedly
hit by a shock (e.g. a lower value of ¿), LY will jump to a new value at the time of
the shock, and jumps to its new steady-state value after one period, which can easily
be seen from the fact that equation (8) only contains one parameter (¿t¡1) and no
variable (LY) that refers to the past.
3.1.1 Long-run consequences of lower transfers
According toconventional wisdom, privatisingsocial security would causesome short-
run pain, but also bring substantial long-run gains. However, the long-run conse-
quences of reducing the social security tax are not as straightforward as they seem.
In particular, a reduction of the social security tax can change the production struc-
tureof theeconomy, andthereby in‡uence therate ofeconomic growth. Thefollowing
proposition holds for the two-sector model presented above.
Proposition 1 Privatisation will eventually reduce economic growth and thus lead
to a lower level of utility in a small open economy.
Proof The long-run impact of the size of the PAYG-scheme (¿) on the economy can




°(1+ g)(r ¡1 ¡ g)
(1+ °)(1+ g)2 ¡ °(1¡ ¿)rg0 > 0:
This expression is positive under assumptions III and IV. ¥
In the long run, a reduction of the PAYG-scheme has three e¤ects on the allocation
of labour over the two sectors, and thereby on the rate of economic growth. First,
if r > 1 + g, lifetime income increases when the PAYG-tax decreases, which results
in a higher demand for both services and commodities. As savings increase, so will
investments abroad. Consequently, net foreign assets increase, which enables the
economy to …nance increased imports (or decreased exports) of commodities from
abroad. Domestic production of commodities will be reduces, which releases labour
15Omitting time subscript denotes the (initial) steady-state value of the variable or parameter.
9from this sector, and more people will be employed in the services sector. This is
necessarybecause the increaseddemandfor services hastobe metbydomestic labour.
As LY decreases, technological progress or knowledge creation slows down. Second,
since this implies a lower economic growth, the internal rate of return of the PAYG-
system decreases. So for agiven social security tax, lifetime income decreases,16 which
leads to a lower demand for services, thus partially o¤setting the initial decrease of
LY. Third, productivity grows at a lower rate, and so do wages and thereby the price
of services. Old-age consumption thus becomes cheaper. In other words, the old are
confronted with a higher real interest rate, implying a higher demand for services.
This also has a negative e¤ect on the employment share of the commodity sector,
and accordingly on economic growth.
3.1.2 Short-run consequences of lower transfers
If the social security tax decreases unexpectedly at time t = 0, the economy will be
in its new steady state as from t = 1 on.17 At the time of the shock, however, the
e¤ects di¤er from its long-run consequences since the old at that time did not foresee
the change in the PAYG-bene…t, nor the changing rate of economic growth (which
re‡ects the increase of the price of services) when they made their savings decision.
As a matter of fact, the short-run e¤ects are the opposite of the long-run e¤ects, as
stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In a small open economy, an unexpected permanent reduction of the
social security scheme initially increases economic growth.





where ¿ (g) denotes the social security tax (growth rate) at the time before the shock
occurred. Becausethe PAYG-tax ischangedunexpectedly at timet = 0, thesesavings
are given, and equation (7) boils down to
LY
0 = 1¡




16Naturally, this second-order e¤ect cannot dominate the …rst-order e¤ect if the stability condition
applies.
17If the privatisation is announced at time t = 0 to take place one period later, no changes in
LY
0 will occur: young individuals decide to save more and consume less, so the total demand for
commodities is unchanged. Because no shock yet occurs, the elderly do not change their demand
for services. In case young individuals also demand services, LY
0 will increase, as is demonstrated in
the Appendix.
10The short-run e¤ects on the employment in the commodity sector can be seen from






(1+ °)(1+ g)2 ¡ r°(1 ¡ ¿)g0 +¿(1+ g)g0;
which is negative if Assumption III holds. ¥
The reason for an increase in the labour share of the commodity sector in the short
run is simple: at the time the PAYG-tax is unexpectedly cut down, old individuals
will have to economise the entire decrease of their pension bene…ts on services, so the
number of employees in the commodity sector will increase.18 Furthermore, the wage
and thereby the price of services that elderly buy at time t = 0 increases, whereas
the interest rate does not change. So the retired will use less services, reinforcing the
initial rise in LY
0.
Figure 1 shows the change in lifetime utility that privatising social security brings
about ina small open economy.19 In this …gure, the horizontal axis denotes the period
in which a certain generation is born, and the vertical axis gives the change in utility
as a fraction of the utility level that the elderly alive at the time of the shock (t = 0)
had.
18If also young individuals demanded services, they would demand more services and commodities
at the time of the shock because their lifetime income increases as long as r > 1 + g holds, which
would push LY down. However, the young would spread this positive income e¤ect over their entire
life, so the increase in the provision of services to the young would be smaller than the reduced
demand by the current old, and LY increases anyway. Furthermore, the economy will be in its
new steady state in the subsequent period, which is characterised by a lower rate of economic (and
thereby wage) growth. Hence, the price of the services that the current young would demand in the
next period will be lower. This would induces them to substitute current services for future services,
thus reinforcing the increase of LY at time t = 0.
19All simulations are based on a productivity growth that is assumed to be a linear function
of the number of employees in the productive sector: gt = ¹ g + ½LY
t , where ¹ g is chosen such that
the equilibrium growth rate is equal to 1 (which corresponds to an annual economywide growth
rate of about 2.3%). The cases considered are ½ ! 0 and ½ = 2 respectively. The production










t+1). Furthermore, r = 3:25 (which corresponds to an annual interest rate
of 4%) and the social security tax is decreased from 20% to 10%.
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Figure 1 E¤ect of privatisation on lifetime utility in a small open economy
If endogenous-growth e¤ects are absent (g0 = 0), the elderly at the time of the shock
will su¤er from a reduction in their pension bene…t, whereas the current young and
all future generations gain equally much because the wage and interest do not change
and accordingly, their lifetime income increases to the same extent.20
In case the production of commodities is characterised by endogenous productiv-
ity growth (g0 > 0), the e¤ects are di¤erent. At the time the privatisation policy is
implemented (t = 0), more people will be employed in the commodity sector, which
stimulates productivity growth. Hence, wages rise and services become more expen-
sive. This was not foreseen by the current old when they made their savings decision,
so they can demand fewer services due to both a lower pension bene…t and higher
prices, and are therefore worse o¤. Individuals born at t = 0 experience three e¤ects.
First, downsizing the social security scheme increases their lifetime income. Second,
because LY
0 increases, the remuneration of their labour duties increases, and third,
fewer people will be employed in the commodity sector at time t = 1, so the services
they consume when old are cheaper. All these elements substantially increase the
20Compensating these elderly for this loss would require an amount equal to the present value of
the gains of future generations (see Verbon, 1988, and Breyer, 1989).
12well-being of the generation that is born at the time of the social security reform. All
future generations also bene…t from a higher lifetime income that is directly caused
by a lower social security tax, as well as from the higher labour productivity they
‘inherit’ from generation t = 0. The number of services they enjoy increases, which
has a positive e¤ect on lifetime utility. However, these future generations face a lower
value of LY, so their own labour productivity grows at a smaller rate. After some
time, this e¤ect will become dominant, and the consumption of commodities by the
young will be lower than before the reduction of the public pension scheme. Howlong
it takes before individual well-being actually deteriorates depends on both individual
preferences and economic factors. First, if agents have a rather strong preference
for services (i.e., ° is high), or if people life rather long (" high), the utility gain
of more services is signi…cant, and the utility loss of fewer commodities is small. It
then takes quite a long time before the utility loss of fewer commodities, due to a
lower growth rate, outweighs the higher utility from more services.21 Furthermore,
if g0 takes a high value, the fall in productivity growth is high and the decrease in
utility will sooner occur. Third, if the interest rate is relatively low or the initial rate
of economic growth high (and the economy is close to the golden rule), a decrease
in the social security tax causes a relatively moderate rise in lifetime income. This
implies a modest contraction of the commodity sector, and thereby a small decrease
of productivity growth, so that utility decreases are delayed.
3.2 Privatisation in a closed economy
A decrease of the unfunded part of social security creates an incentive for individuals
to save more for their oldage. In a closedeconomy, this will result ina higher physical
capital stock and consequently a¤ect factor rewards. This subsection focuses on the
e¤ects of privatisation in such an economy.22
As in a small open economy, the labour and service markets both clear if
LY
t = 1¡ dt: (9)
However, no international trade of commodities is possible in a closed economy, so
the total domestic demand for commodities, which consists of consumption and in-
21This is especially so if services like health care only raise utility when their level is above a
certain minimum requirement, in which case a Stone-Geary utility function is most appropriate.
22Note that this framework is also applicable to the case of many (small) open economies that
simultaneously implement the same privatisation policy.











Finally, since there is no scope for international lending and borrowing, aggregate
savings are entirely invested domestically, and the interest rate is determined endoge-
nously. If capital fully depreciates in one period, this implies that the capital market








Combining these equations gives a two-dimensional non-linear system in LY
t and ·t.
Because the capital stock is determined by savings in the previous period, we get a
saddle-point stable system with one forward-looking (or jump) variable, LY, and one
backward-looking (or state) variable, ·. The e¤ects of a change in the social security
tax are analysed by linearising the equilibrium conditions around the initial steady
state. We assume this steady state to be saddle-point stable.
3.2.1 Long-run consequences of lower transfers
In the previous section it was shown that for a small open economy characterised by
perfect capital mobility, reducing the PAYG-scheme has a negativeimpact on the rate
of economic growth in the long run, because it increases the demand for services and
import goods from abroad. Thus, fewer people will be employed in the productive
sector and growth e¤ects are smaller. In a closed economy, however, international
lending and borrowing is not possible, and the capital stock is entirely determined
by domestic savings. As a consequence, the long-run e¤ects of privatising social
security on the rate of economic growth are quite di¤erent, as stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Privatisation will eventuallystimulate economic growth and thus lead
to a higher level of utility in a closed economy. The (e¤ective) capital-labour ratio
rises in the long run.
Proof See Appendix. ¥
A lower social security tax increases the lifetime income of individuals. For a given
price level and interest rate, this implies a higher demand for both services and
14commodities. Because capital is only employed in one sector, and labour in both,
labour will become relatively more scarce, which pushes wages up. As this implies an
increase in the price of services, the relative demand for services will decrease, so the
employment share of the commodity sector grows and productivity growth increases.
Furthermore, a lower social security tax also increases savings and thereby stimulates
the accumulation of physical capital, which is only used in the commodity sector.
This increase in the capital stock outweighs the rise in employment in the commodity
sector so that the capital-labour ratio rises. This makes labour more productive in
the commodity sector and consequently, wages rise and the services sector contracts.
Note that the decrease in the provision of services implies that individuals can en-
joy fewer services when they are old, despite the higher lifetime income and increased






higher lifetime utility that privatisation causes in the long run is therefore solely due
to the increased consumption of commodities when young. Consequently, this rise in
lifetime utility goes along with a decrease in equity between the old and the young
living in the same period: the young pro…t from the higher savings of the previous
generation, while this old generation itself e¤ectively gets poorer.
3.2.2 Short-run consequences of lower transfers
A sudden change in the social security tax at time t = 0 initially only a¤ects the
economy through a change in the division of labour over the two sectors since the
size of the capital stock is determined by the savings of the previous period.23 In
the subsequent periods savings and thus the capital stock gradually move to the new
steady-state level, and so does the number of employees in the commodity sector.
Proposition 4 In a closed economy, an unexpected decline of the social security tax
causes more people to be employed in the commodity sector and thus stimulates growth
in the short run. Consequently, the (e¤ective) capital-labour ratio decreases.









f(·) . Furthermore, di¤erentiating the capital market





























23In case of an expected shock, no change in LY
0 nor k0 occurs (see Appendix).
15The RHS of this expression is always negative, whereas the LHS can numerically be
shown to be always positive. Hence,
dLY
0
d¿ < 0. From this it immediately follows that
d·0
d¿ > 0. ¥
Privatising social security thus immediately increases the growth rate because the
purchasing power of the initial elderly is reduced, implying a smaller services sector.
On the other hand, · initially decreases because both A0 and LY
0 increase, and the
physical capital stock is …xed in the short run. This implies that wages may well fall
in the short run if ¿ is reduced, making services cheaper. This will be so if growth
e¤ects are not very substantial and if labour and capital are complements (i.e., if ¾
is low).
The decrease in ¿ leads to higher savings, thus to a higher capital-labour ratio
and higher wages in the next period. The higher wages raise savings further so that
the capital-labour ratio in the subsequent period is again higher. This process of a
rising capital stock also implies that more people are attracted to be employed in the
commodity sector, so also LY steadily rises. Therefore, thenumber ofservices enjoyed
by elderly individuals decreases, whereas savings gradually rise. That is, although
people save more, this does not allow them to consume more services when they have
grown old. The reason for this is that the only way to transfer purchasing power to
old age is through investment in capital that is only useful for the production of com-
modities, something the elderly do not want to consume. Instead, they demand more
services, which increases the price of services, and together with a lower interest rate
o¤sets the e¤ect of the increase in savings. Figure 2 shows the e¤ects of privatisation
on lifetime utility in a closed economy (the e¤ects for a small openeconomy, as shown
in Figure 1, are also displayed).
First consider the case without growth(g0 = 0). Because at time t = 0 the capital-
labour ratio decreases, theelderly receive a higher interest ontheir savings, and wages
decrease which makes their services cheaper. This partly o¤sets the decrease of their
public pension bene…t, so they are less worse o¤ than they would be in a small open
economy. Individuals born at the time of the privatisation (t = 0), however, are
confronted with a lower wage when they are young, and also save more, resulting
in a growing capital stock. This causes the capital-labour ratio to be higher at the
time they have become old, so wages and thereby the price of future services will be
higher. Overall, these individuals su¤er from the social security reform, contrary to
their contemporaries in a small open economy.
16generation
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Figure 2 E¤ect of privatisation on lifetime utility in a closed economy
Later generations will experience increasingly higher wages though, and are therefore
better o¤ as long as the economy stays dynamically e¢cient. The consumption of
commodities when young increases, but due to a lower PAYG-bene…t, a higher wage
and a lower interest rate, the number of services receives when old decreases. So
the utility gap between the young and old increases. If individuals care a lot about
an equal distribution of well-being over their lifetime, or if there is some minimum
number of services a person needs when old, they will try to prevent the increase
of this utility gap from happening by saving more. However, this will increase the
capital-labour ratio further, so wages rise even more and the interest decreases to a
greater extent, which only increases the gap further. The economy will thus soon end
up in a situation of dynamic ine¢ciency, and the government can increase welfare by
running a PAYG-scheme. Yet in Figure 2, the economy stays dynamically e¢cient.
Because the capital-labour ratio increases, it moves closer to the golden rule level.
This does not happen in a small open economy, so future generations gain more from
privatisation in a closed economy as compared to a small open economy.
Figure 2 also shows the change in utility in case there is endogenous growth.
The higher it is, the more wages rise at time t = 0 due to the initial increase of
17LY in a closed economy. At the same time, however, it makes the capital stock
that the elderly at time t = 0 own more productive, as the employees apply it more
productively, and this raises the interest rate. The di¤erence with the case in which
g0 = 0 is therefore very small. The young at the time of the transition, however, are
better o¤ (or less worse o¤) if g0 is higher, and naturally the same holds for all future
generations since LY increases in the long run after a reduction of the social security
tax. Therefore, the welfare e¤ects of privatising social security depend more crucially
on the openness of the economy if growth e¤ects in the productive sector are more
important. Again, the consumption of commodities when young increases, whereas
the number of services enjoyed when old decreases. Endogenous growth adds to this
growing utility gap between young and old.
3.3 Conclusions so far
In this section we showed that the welfare e¤ects of reforming social security are not
as clear as is often suggested. Because individuals’ tastes for tradable commodities
and non-tradable services di¤er with age, a change in the intergenerational redistri-
bution causes a change in the production structure of the economy. Depending on
the openness of the economy, this a¤ects international trade and the extent to which
the economy specializes in the provision of services. As the accumulation of (tech-
nological) knowledge typically takes place in the capital-intensive sector, the rate
at which productivity grows subsequently changes and thereby the welfare of future
generations.
In particular, in a small open economy with endogenous growth, privatising social
security as advocated by Feldstein will leadto adilemma: lifetimeincome will initially
rise more than with exogenous technological progress, but this rise in wealth will
lead to a kind of “Dutch disease”: the import of commodities rises and the country
specialises more in the production of non-tradable low-tech services, which lowers
growth.24 That is, the larger welfare gains for the current young come at the cost
of lower welfare for generations born in the (distant) future. Moreover, endogenous-
growth e¤ects increase the welfare loss for the current old caused by the privatisation.
So in an open economy, introducing endogenous growth intensi…es the di¤erence in
24A similar shift of labour from tradables production to non-tradable services and a subsequent
productivity loss is found in Smulders and Van de Klundert (2001) who analyse the e¤ects of
the initial distribution of …nancial wealth across countries on long-run growth and cross-country
productivity levels.
18position between the two “parties” that have to decide on Feldstein’s proposal in
the political arena, i.e., the current young and the current old. At the same time,
however, it may weaken theposition of the young, as it deprives them of the argument
that privatisation bene…ts future generations.
In case of a closed economy, the e¤ects are quite di¤erent. Increased savings
now raise the capital stock and thus increase wages, i.e., the price of services. As a
consequence, privatisation does not lead to an increase in the relative importance of
the services sector but causes this sector to shrink, thus stimulating growth. As a
result, it favours future generations. However, this comes at the cost of a decrease
in welfare of both current generations: not only the old but also the young will lose.
Endogenous-growth e¤ects reduce the welfare loss for the current young and reinforce
the gains for future generations without harming the current elderly. This will not
a¤ect decision making in a representative democracy where decisions are made by
current generations that do not take the welfare e¤ects of future generations into
account. It only increases the costs of myopic decision making in terms of the welfare
of future generations.
4 Population ageing
In this section, we analyse the e¤ects of a longer life span on economic growth and
welfare. Again we make a distinction between a small open economy and a closed
economy. The social security tax is assumed to be constant.
4.1 Ageing in a small open economy
As individuals face a probability " to live in the second period, " also re‡ects the




t = "tdt: (12)
This, together with equilibrium onthe labour market and (5) and (6), implicitly gives















19Again, the current state of this small open economy, as implicitly summarised by
(14), contains no variable or parameters that refer to the past and is therefore not
related to its history.25 The e¤ects of a change in the rate of population growth can
be traced by linearising (14) around the initial steady state, as is described in the
Appendix. In case the small open economy is unexpectedly hit by an increase of ",
the variable LY will jump to a new value at the time of the shock, and jumps to its
new steady-state value one period later.
4.1.1 Long-run consequences of ageing
The long-run e¤ect of a longer life span on the employment level of the commodity
sector, and thereby on the rate of economic growth, is negative, as the following
proposition asserts.
Proposition 5 In a small open economy, population ageing will lead to a lower rate
of economic growth in the long run.
Proof The long-run impact of an increasing life span on the economy can be traced




°(1+ g)(r(1 ¡¿) +¿(1+ g))
(1 +°")((1+ °")(1+ g)2 ¡ °"r(1¡ ¿)g0)
< 0: (15)
Assumption IV implies that the denominator of (15) is positive, so
dLY
d" < 0. ¥
If people expect to live longer, they will decide to save more when they are young.
These increased savings are invested abroad, yielding a return of r. With these re-
turns, theelderly individuals buy services that areprovidedby their children. Because
the retired use more services, the number of young people employed in that sector
increases, leaving fewer people in the capital-intensive commodity sector. As a conse-
quence, the growth rate decreases. Furthermore, the decline of domestic commodity
production will be compensated by higher imports of these goods from abroad (or
lower exports), which is …nanced by the increased foreign asset returns.
A lower growth rate implies that future services become cheaper, so the real
interest rate (in terms of services) increases. As can be seen from (6), savings are not
in‡uenced by this. Hence, each retired person can use more services.
25If young individuals also demand services, the solution of LY
t is a terminal-value problem as LY
t
is a forward-looking variable. See Subsection 5.2 and the Appendix for more details.
204.1.2 Short-run consequences of ageing
If the life span increases unexpectedly at time t = 0, the economy will be in its new
steady state as from t = 1 on. At the time of the shock, however, the e¤ects di¤er
from the long-run consequences since the old at that time did not foresee the change
in the PAYG-bene…t, nor the changing rate of economic growth (which re‡ects the
increase of the price of services) when they made their savings decision. In a small
open economy, the interest rate and the PAYG-tax do not change, so the elderly still
spend the same amount of money on services. Consequently, the allocation of labour
over the two sectors does not change either, and growth is not a¤ected by ageing in
the short run.
Proposition 6 Increasing longevity does not a¤ect economic growth in the short run
for a small open economy.
Proof At time t = ¡1, individual savings are given by s¡1. Because ageing occurs









In this equation, "0 does not appear, so
dLY
0
d"0 = 0. ¥
This also holds in case the longer life span is foreseen. Then, people start saving
more at time t = 0, but this basically implies a shift from the demand of consump-
tion commodities to investment commodities, which does not a¤ect the size of the
commodity sector.26
Figure 3 shows the consequences of population ageing on the lifetime utility of suc-
cessive generations.27 First consider the case without endogenous growth (g0 = 0).
26There will be e¤ects on growth in the short run if agents also demand services when they are
young, as described in Subsection 5.2.
If ageing is the result of a lower rate of population growth, growth will decrease if the economy is
a net lendor. If the young demand services too, the e¤ects of such a form of ageing depend on the
size of the PAYG-scheme. See Subsection 5.1 for details.
27Simulations are based on the same production function as applied in Figure 1. Furthermore,
° = 0:9, r = 3:25, ¿ = 0:/ 2, ½ = 2 in case of endogenous growth, and " increases from 2
3 to 0:7. In
order to compare lifetime utility before and after the shock properly, we took the value of " constant
at unity, so we compare the lifetime utility of individuals who live both periods.
21In a small open economy, the factor rewards do not change. As there is no endoge-
nous productivity change either, the lifetime income of individuals remains the same.
However, people live longer on average, so the period during which they can spend
their lifetime income becomes longer. The consumption of commodities and services
thus decreases, and utility decreases likewise (on average).
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Figure 3 E¤ect of increasing longevity on lifetime utility in a small open economy
With endogenous growth, the e¤ects for the currently old are not di¤erent from the
case in which g0 = 0 because the number of employees in the commodity sector does
not change in the short run. The wage of the individuals born at time t = 0 therefore
doesnot changeeither. However, less peoplewill be employedin the commodity sector
at time t = 1, so the wage rate will be lower. Consequently, the services that the
generation born at the time of the shock will buy when they are old will be cheaper.
This positive price e¤ect alleviates the direct negative e¤ect of a longer life span on
utility. In the long run, individuals su¤er from the fact that a lower productivity
growth reduces the wage they earn when young, enabling them to purchase less
commodities.
224.2 Ageing in a closed economy










Furthermore, equilibrium on the commodity and capital market is given by (9) and
(10) respectively.
4.2.1 Long-run consequences of ageing
The long-run consequences of population ageing on the rate of economic growth
depend on theextent towhichcapital andlabour can be substituted in the production
process of commodities, as summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 The long-run rate of economic growth decreases (increases) in a
closed economy due to population ageing if the elasticity of substitution between cap-
ital and labour is greater (smaller) than unity. Ageing has no e¤ect on growth if this
elasticity equals unity. The capital-labour ratio always increases.
Proof See Appendix. ¥
Increasing longevity gives people an incentive to save more when they are young.
This raises the capital stock that is used in the commodity sector, so capital becomes
relatively more abundant in that sector. If capital is a good substitute for labour
(¾ > 1), thisimplies that labour toobecomes relativelyabundant inthis sector sothat
the wage decreases and individuals would earn more in the services sector. A higher
number of people will therefore be employed in the services sector (so that wages are
equal in both sectors again). However, if capital and labour are complements rather
than substitutes (¾ < 1), the productivity of employees in the commodity sector
increases, which subsequently attracts labour from the services sector, so growth
increases. In case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, capital and labour are
not complements nor substitutes, so then ageing causes no change in the division of
labour and thereby in the growth rate.28
28This directly follows from the equilibrium condition for the commodity market, according to
which the wage share does not depend on the capital-labour ratio (i.e.,
wtAtLY
t
Yt = 1 ¡ a), so that
LY
t = (1¡¿)(1¡a). Allowing for consumption of services by the young does not change this result.
234.2.2 Short-run consequences of ageing
As is the case for the small open economy, increasing longevity does not in‡uence the
allocation of labour over the two sectors in the short run, which leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 8 In a closed economy, increasing longevity does not a¤ect economic
growth in the short run, nor the (e¤ective) capital-labour ratio.








more, di¤erentiating the capital market equation (11) at time t = 0, taking savings of









d" . Combining these




d" = 0. ¥
Again, elderly individuals cannot react to their longer life span. The savings they
invested whenyoung givea lower returnr=", andthe sameholds for the social security
bene…t. Hence, they will be able to use less services and are therefore worse o¤. The
allocation of labour over the two sectors does not change, so the capital-labour ratio
also remains the same.
The e¤ects of a longer life span on the lifetime utility of subsequent generations in a
closed economy are displayed in Figure 4.29
First consider the case of capital and labour being complements in the produc-
tion process of commodities (¾ < 1). Because at the time of the shock, the labour
allocation nor the capital-labour ratio change, the wage and interest rate remain the
same. Therefore, the group of retired as a while receives the same return on the sav-
ings, but because more people survived, each elderly individual gets a lower return
on his savings, so the utility of this generation decreases. The young at that time
receive the same wage, but will decide to save a higher fraction of it, so they will
consume less commodities. These higher savings translate into a higher capital stock
in the next period, which attracts labour to the commodity sector since labour and
capital are complements. Hence, LY increases, and so does the capital-labour ratio.
Consequently, wages rise and services become more expensive, enabling the members
of this generation to buy less services. The next generation earns this higher wage
29In this …gure, we took ° = 0:75 in order to ensure that the economy is dynamically e¢cient
both before and after the shock. If capital and labour are complements, ¾ = 0:8, and in case of
substitutability, ¾ = 1:2.
24when young, so their savings will be higher, resulting in even higher wages the period
after that. As this process continues, LY rises and productivity grows further, so
people will be able to consume more commodities when young. This will eventually
compensate the loss of utility that is the result of fewer services during old age.
generation
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
K and L complements, no growth (g'=0)
K and L complements, growth (g'>0)
K and L substitutes, no growth (g'=0)
K and L substitutes, growth (g'>0)
0
Figure 4 E¤ect of increasing life span on lifetime utility in a closed economy
The short run e¤ects of ageing are (qualitatively) the same if capital and labour are
substitutes. In the long run, a higher capital stock implies that labour too becomes
relatively abundant in the commodity sector. Therefore, some individuals will move
out of that sector and be employed in the services sector, so productivity growth
will eventually slowdown, and the lifetime utility of future generations decreases due
to an increasing life span. The e¤ects of privatisation and population ageing are
summarised in Table 1.
25Table 1
Privatising Increasing longevity
variable SOE CLE SOE CLE (¾ < 1) CLE (¾ > 1)
short run
LY
0 ; g0 + + 0 0 0
·0 0 - 0 0 0
p0= w0 + + 0 0 0
c0 + + - - -
d0 - - - - -
U¡1 - - - - -
U0 + - -/+¤ - -
long run
LY; g - + - + -
· 0 + 0 + +
p = w - + - + -
c - + - + -
d + - + - -
U - + - + -
¤ Depending (among other things) on the size of the PAYG-scheme.
5 Extensions and modi…cations
In this section we explore the e¤ects of privatisation and population ageing when the
model presented above is extended or modi…ed in several ways. First, we consider the
consequences of ageing if this is due to a lower rate of population growth. Second,
the assumption that only old individuals demand services is modi…ed, and …nally,
a pension system that promises the retired a …xed amount of services is taken into
consideration.
5.1 Population ageing as a lower fertility rate
Suppose the economy is inhabited by Nt young people at time t, and population
grows at rate n, such that Nt+1 = (1+ nt)Nt. Population ageing takes the form of a
lower value of n, and equilibrium on the labour market implies that Nt = LY
t + LD
t .
We now assume that the productivity growth rate depends on the fraction of young
26people employed in the productive sector: gt = g(lY





we take " constant and equal to unity, and the social security tax ¿ does not change
either. The PAYG-bene…t that an old individual at time t+ 1 receives now equals






5.1.1 The case of a small open economy
Equilibrium on both the labour and services market is given by
l
Y









(1+°)(1+n)(1+g)2¡°(1¡¿)rg0 > 0, so
again, ageing reduces the (relative) number of people working in the commodity
sector and thereby economic growth, as is the case when lifespan increases. Notice
that d2lY
dnd¿ < 0, so the negative e¤ect of a lower fertility rate on economic growth is
curbed by a PAYG-scheme.
However, the short run e¤ects are di¤erent. If the fertility rate decreases unex-
pectedly at time t = 0, the economy will again be in its new steady state as from
t = 1 on. In this case, equation (14) can be written as
lY
0 = 1 ¡
r°(1 ¡ ¿)




(1 + °)(1 +g(lY
0 ))
¡ ¿;
where g (n) denotes the growth (fertility) rate at the time before the shock occurred
(that people took into account when making their savings decision at time t = 0).






(1+ °)(1+ n)(1 +g)2¡ r°(1¡ ¿)g0 + (1+ n)(1 +g)¿g0:
The denominator is negative when assumption III holds. Ageing implies a relatively
higher number of elderly individuals. If the country is a net lender (s > 0), then
relatively more people will spend their income on services, and lY
0 decreases, so pro-
ductivity growth will already decrease in the short run. Consequently, the price of
the services that these old individuals buy decreases, so the direct negative e¤ect of a
higher dependency ratio on the PAYG-bene…t will be alleviated by an lower in‡ation
rate, i.e., an increase in the real interest rate. The reverse holds if the economy is
30This assumption is necessary to calculate an equilibrium.
27a net borrower (s < 0), which is the case if the social security tax is rather high.
Then, elderly individuals who borrowed an amount of Nt¡1st¡1 from foreigners when
they were young, have to pay o¤ this same amount from a lower transfer they receive
from their children, who have decreased in number: Nt¡1(1+nt)¿wt. So, there is less
money left for the purchase of services, and lY
0 increases.
5.1.2 The case of a closed economy
In a closed economy, the long-run e¤ects of a lower rate of fertility are the same as
those of a longer lifespan. In both cases, the dependency ratio increases and people
have a stronger incentive to save, causing the capital-labour ratio to increase and
the (relative) number of employees in the commodity sector to increase (decrease)
if capital and labour are complements (substitutes) in that sector. The same can
be said for the short run in case fertility (unexpectedly) decreases. This can be























































(1¡ ¿)(¾ ¡ 1)·2f00(·)
f(·)(1 +n)
:
The RHS of this expression is positive (negative) if ¾ > (<)1, whereas the LHS
can numerically be shown to be always positive. Hence,
dlY
0
dn > 0 if ¾ > 1, and the
opposite holds if ¾ < 1. From this it immediately follows that d·0
dn < 0. In case of a
Cobb-Douglas production function (¾ = 1),
dlY
0





So contrary to increasing longevity, a lower population growth rate does a¤ect
productivity growth in the short run. This is so because a lower fertility rate im-
mediately decreases the number of young individuals, whereas the capital stock is
…xed in the short run. Hence, the capital is becoming relatively abundant in the
28commodity sector. This attracts labour to that sector if both production factors are
complements, whereas lY decreases in case of substitutability.
The short-run e¤ects of population ageing are summarised in Table 2.
Table 2
Decreasing fertility Increasing longevity
variable SOE CLE (¾<1) CLE (¾>1) SOE CLE (¾<1) CLE (¾>1)
short run
LY
0 , g0 - + - 0 0 0
k0 0 + + 0 0 0
p0=w0 - + + 0 0 0
c0 - + + - - -
d0 + - - - - -
U¡1 + - - - - -
U0 - - - -/+¤ - -
¤ Depending (among other things) on the size of the PAYG-scheme.
5.2 Allowing for service demand by the young
In this section we investigate the e¤ects of ageing for a small open economy in case
individuals also demand services when they are young. The e¤ects of privatisating
social security and the e¤ects of ageing in a closed economy are qualitatively not
di¤erent from the e¤ects when services demand by the young is absent.






































(1+ ¯ + °"t+1)wt+1
+
°(1+ nt+1)¿
1+ ¯ + °"t+1
:
Equilibrium on the services and labour market is given by
L
Y





Note that the current state of the economy, as summarised by (18), is not related to
its past. Instead, the solution of (18) is a terminal-value problem (see Appendix for
details). The e¤ects of a change in the average life span can be traced by linearising
(18) around the initial steady state. In case the small open economy is unexpectedly
hit by a shock, the forward-looking variable LY (or lY) will jump to a new value at
the time of the shock, and jumps to its newsteady-state value after one period, which
can easily be seen from the fact that equation (18) only contains one parameter ("t¡1)
and no variable (LY) that refers to the past (see Appendix for details). Furthermore,







The long rune¤ects of a longer average life span can be traced by linearising equation




°(1 +g)(¯(1+ g) ¡r(1+ ¯))(¿(1 +g) + r(1¡ ¿))
(1 +¯ +°")(r(1+ ¯ + °")(1 +g)2 + ¯¿(1 +g)2g0 ¡ r2°(1¡ ¿)"g0)
;
which is clearly negative if Assumptions III and IV hold. Naturally, the fact that
young individuals demand services too does not change the result that ageing leads
to lower long-run productivity growth in a small open economy.
In the short run, however, the e¤ects are di¤erent from the case that ¯ = 0. This
canbe seen by looking at the equilibrium conditionfor the services and labour market












r(1+ ¯ + °"1)
¡
r(1¡ ¿)°"




(1+ ¯ + °"1)(1 +g(LY
0 ))
¡ ¿;
30where " (g) refers to the initial steady state value, i.e., the onethat individuals bornat
time t = ¡1 took into account whenthey made their savings decision. Di¤erentiating







¯°r(1¡ ¿) + ¯°(1 +g)¿ ¡ (1+ ¯ + °")¯¿g0 dLY
d"
´
r(1+ ¯ + °")((1+ ¯ + °")(1+ g)2 + r(1 ¡ ¿)°"g0 ¡ (1+ ¯)¿(1 +g)g0)
:
Knowing that dLY
d" < 0, it immediately follows that
dLY
0
d" > 0 if s > 0. That is,
increasing longevity will stimulate growth in the short run if young individuals also
demand services. This is so because these young individuals expect to spend a longer
time in retirement and therefore decide to increase their savings. In order to do this,
they will ask less services when young. Another reason is that future services will be
cheaper, because LY decreases at time t = 1, so current services are substituted for
future services. The group of elderly individuals as a whole at time t = 0 will buy as
many services as before, because each old individual receives a proportionately lower
return on his savings and social security bene…t. So fewer people will be employed in
the services sector, and more in the commodity sector, which stimulates productivity
growth.
5.2.2 Decreasing population growth
The long run e¤ects of a lower fertility rate can be traced by linearising equation




(1+ g)(°(1 ¡ ¿)r2 ¡ ¯¿(1+ g)2(1 +n)2)
(1+ n)((1+ ¯ + °")r(1+ g)2(1+ n) + ¯(1+ n)2(1 +g)2¿g0 ¡ °(1¡ ¿)r2g0)
;
which is positive under Assumptions III and IV, and a social security tax that is not
too high, i.e., ¿ <
°
¯+°. So now too, population ageing will lower the long-run rate of
economic growth.
In the short run, the e¤ects are di¤erent, both from the case in which ¯ = 0 and
from the e¤ect of increasing longevity. Di¤erentiating (18) at time t = 0, taking the










Due to assumption III, the denominator is positive. If ¿ = 0, then
dlY
0
dn > 0, so ageing
leads to a lower productivity growth in the short run. If ¿ = 1, then
dlY
0
dn < 0 and
31ageing implies a higher productivity growth in the short run. This, together with
the fact that (19) is a continuous and decreasing function of ¿, implies that there is
a unique ¿¤ 2 (0;1) for which
dlY
0
dn = 0. Consequently, for all ¿ < ¿¤ it holds that
dlY
0
dn > 0, so unexpected ageing leads to a lower value of lY
0 , and the reverse holds if
¿ > ¿¤.
Population ageing has four e¤ects on the division of labour over the two sectors at
time t = 0. First, the relative number of old individuals who spend their savings on
services increases, so lY decreases. If the social security tax is high, individual savings
are relatively low and the pension bene…t decreases considerably, so this e¤ect will be
moderate. Second, young agentsat thattimeforesee alowerpension bene…t whenold,
and thus decide to save more, i.e., consume fewer services, which a¤ects lY positively.
This is especially so if the social security tax is quite high, because then the drop in
the pension bene…t due to ageing will be rather sizeable. Therefore, the second e¤ect
will dominate the …rst e¤ect if the PAYG-scheme is relatively generous. Economic
growth will then increase in the short run due to ageing, whereas the reverse holds
if ¿ is relatively low. Third, the economy is in its new steady state as from time
t = 1 on, with a lower rate of economic growth, so current services become more
expensive relative to future services. Hence, the social security bene…t the young
expect to receive when old decreases in terms of current services, which decreases
the current demand for services by the young, driving lY up, again especially if the
PAYG-scheme is ratherextensive. Finally, the change in the current divisionoflabour
a¤ects the productivity growth, and thereby the current wage and price of services.
If lY initially increases, services become more expensive, so the elderly’s real interest
rate is lower, urging them to demand fewer services, pushing lY down (the opposite
holds if lY
0 decreases). Naturally, this second-order e¤ect does not dominate the other
e¤ects. The second and third e¤ects disappear if young individuals do not demand
any services (i.e., if ¯ = 0).
Figure 5 shows the consequences of population ageing on the lifetime utility of suc-
cessive generations, for di¤erent values of the social security tax (¿ = 0 and ¿ = 0:2
respectively).31
31Simulations are based on the same production function as applied in Figure 1. Furthermore,
¯ = 1; °" = 2
3, r = 3:25, ½ = 2 in case of endogenous growth and n is decreased from 0.2 to 0.
32generation
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Figure 5 Decreasing fertility in a small open economy when ¯ > 0
If there is no PAYG-scheme, relatively more people will be employed in the services
sector at the time of the shock. This implies a lower productivity growth, so wages
decline and the elderly pay a lower price for their services, allowing them to enjoy
more services which increases their utility. However, the wage that the young at time
t = 0 receive has become lower, and thereby their lifetime income. The consumption
of commodities therefore decreases, whereas the number of services enjoyed when
young stays the same. Because of a lower future price of services, the number of
services enjoyed when old increases. Overall, utility decreases due to ageing. The
same holds for all subsequent generations.
On theotherhand, ifthe social security scheme is relatively extensive, morepeople
will be employed in the commodity sector at the time of the shock. This increases
their productivity, and thus increases the wages, so the then living elderly can enjoy
fewer services. Apart from that, their utility also decreases because of the lower social
security bene…t they receive due to ageing. As for the young generation at that time,
although they earn a higher wage, the price of current services rises just as much;
furthermore, the PAYG-bene…t they expect to receive when old decreases in terms
of current services, both due to a lower population growth and a lower future wage
33growth. So they decide to save more, i.e., consume fewer services and commodities
when young. When they are old, they have a higher capital income at their disposal,
and face lower prices of services. This allows them to enjoy more services when
retired, even though the public pension bene…t has decreased.
This also holds for all future generations. They su¤er utility losses because the
growth rate is lower, and thereby their lifetime income. However, they are less worse
o¤ when the PAYG-scheme is generous because in that case, the reduction of lY due
to ageing is moderate.
5.3 Fixed-bene…t PAYG-pensions
In the previous sections, the social security tax that young individuals pay was kept
constant, or, in the case of privatisation, reduced to a lower constant level. So elderly
individuals receive a pension bene…t that decreases if the dependency ratio rises. So
the retired bear the full risk of adverse demographic changes. The alternative would
be a social security scheme that ensures each pensioner a …xed amount of services.
In that case, the PAYG-tax is ‡exible and responds to changes in the demographic
structure and factor rewards. This subsection investigates the e¤ects of population
ageing if such a pension scheme is in place.
Suppose that the government ensures every retiree ´ services. The social security
tax is then equal to ¿t = ´"t. Di¤erentiating the equilibrium condition for the services







(1 +g)°¿(r ¡ 1¡ g)
(1+ °")(1 +g)2 ¡ °"r(1¡ ¿)g0;
where dLY
d" [¹ ¿] < 0 is the change in the labour share of the commodity sector if the
social security tax is kept constant, as given by (15). One can clearly see that if the
economy is dynamically e¢cient, the decline of LY, and thereby of economic growth
in the long run, is smaller in case of a …xed-bene…t pension scheme.32 Increasing
longevity implies that the social security tax has to rise in order to …nance the higher
amount of public pensions paid out to retirees. In a dynamically e¢cient economy,
this means a decline in the lifetime income of individuals, so it decreases the demand
for commodities and services and thereby o¤sets part of the increased demand for
services that is directly caused by a higher dependency ratio.
32Assuming that for both pension systems, the initial steady state is the same.
34In a closed economy, long-run equilibrium on the commodity market is given by
LY









t+1 = ±1d·t+1 +±2d"t+1;
with ±1 ´
(1¡¿)(¾¡1)·f00(·)






< 0. The labour and services
market clear if LY





1+°"t+1, which results in
dL
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(1+°")(1+g)2¡°"r(1¡¿)g0, and¸1;2;3 are givenin the Appendix. Combining







¸1 + ¸2 ¡ ±1
:
Knowing that ±2 = 0 in case pension bene…t are not de…ned, and that ¸3 > ¸
0
3 > 0,
we can conclude that the capital-labour ratio rises to a smaller extent due to ageing if
the social security scheme pays a …xed number of services to each retired individual.









d" is smaller in case of a …xed-bene…t scheme and ±2 < 0, it is clear
that
dLY
d" will be smaller if ±1 ¸ 0, i.e., if ¾ · 1 (capital and labour being complements
in the production of commodities), so the e¤ects of population ageing on long-run
growth are more moderate. But if ¾ > 1 (substitutability), such a conclusion can not






¯ is smaller or bigger than without …xing
the PAYG-bene…t.
6 Conclusions
Elderly people typically have two sources of income at their disposal: the assets they
accumulated during their working life and the transfers they receive from the current
young generation. It is well known that the second source will increasingly be under
pressure with a rising dependency ratio that is due to population ageing. This does
not mean, however, thatthe …rstincomesourceiscompletely safeandshouldtherefore
be entirely relied upon. If many people save and thus invest, capital will become
35relatively abundant and the interest rate decreases, which implies a lower return on
savings. This is especially so if the demand for labour increases due to a longer life
span. Furthermore, elderly people are particularly vulnerable to high in‡ation rates,
as this excavates the purchasing power of the capital they accumulated and depend
so heavily upon. A factor that is of great importance in this respect is the fact that
elderly people seem to spend relatively much on services that typically use a lot of
labour. This makes them vulnerable for wage increases, which are due to productivity
improvements caused by increasing capital accumulation and technological progress
in the productive sector. Reducing the unfunded part of social security, a policy
measure that is often presented as the solution to an ageing population, will only
aggravate this and thus quickly lead to a situation of dynamic ine¢ciency.
36Appendix
Steady-state equilibrium
Equation (8) implicitly gives the steady-state equilibria for LY
t = LY
t+1. In order for a
steady-state equilibrium to exist, the following assumption with respect to the growth
function is made.





Appendix to Subsection 3.2: Privatisation in a closed economy
Comparative dynamics
Linearisingthe equilibrium conditionforthe commodity marketat time t+1, equation
(10), yields
dLY
t+1 = ±1d·t+1 + ±2d¿t+1; (A.1)
with ±1 ´
(1¡¿)(¾¡1)·f00(·)
f(·) and ±2 ´
·r¡f(·)
f(·) . Linearising (9), which describes equilib-




t+1 = ¸1d·t + ¸2d·t+1 + ¸3d¿t + ¸4d¿t+1; (A.2)
where ¸1 ´
(1+g)°(1¡¿)r·f00(·)
((1+°)(1+g)2¡°(1¡¿)rg0)(f(·)¡·r), ¸2 ´ ¡¸1
f(·)









































Knowing that f(·) > ·r and taking Assumption III into account, it can easily be
seen that this condition always holds if ¾ ¸ 1. Furthermore, simulations with a linear
growth function (gt = ¹ g + ½LY
t ) show that the stability condition also holds for all
values of ¾ below unity for which a steady-state equilibrium exists.
Using the equilibrium condition for the capital market, it can be shown that








±1¸3 ¡ ±2¸1 +±1¸4 ¡ ±2¸2
±1 ¡ ¸1 ¡ ¸2
: (A.4)
The denominator of this equation is always negative. Furthermore, simulations with
a linear growth function (gt = ¹ g + ½LY






















. Knowing that ¸1; dLY
d¿ < 0, ¸3 > 0 and 1+g < r, it follows that d·
d¿ < 0.
Short-run e¤ect expected privatisation
If the reduction in ¿ is announced at time t = 0 to take place at t = 1, the change in




























d¿ = 0. As in a small open economy, young individuals
decide to save more, but because they do not demand services, this merely implies a
lower consumptiondemandfor commodities andanequally higherinvestmentdemand
for commodities, leaving the labour division unchanged.
Appendix to Subsection 4.2: Ageing in a closed economy




t+1 = ±d·t+1; (A.7)
with± ´
(1¡¿)(¾¡1)·f00(·)
f(·) , andlinearising (9) for time t+1, whichdescribes equilibrium
on both the labour and services market, gives
dL
Y
t+1 = ¸1d·t + ¸2d·t+1 +¸3d"t+1; (A.8)
38where¸1 ´
(1+g)°"(1¡¿)r·f00(·)
((1+°")(1+g)2¡°"(1¡¿)rg0)(f(·)¡·r), ¸2 ´ ¡¸1
f(·)
·r , ¸3 ´ ¡
°(1+g)(r(1¡¿)+¿(1+g))
((1+°")(1+g)2¡°"(1¡¿)rg0)(1+°").





















± ¡ ¸1 ¡ ¸2
: (A.10)
Knowing that ¸3 < 0 and ±¡¸1¡¸2 < 0 (stability), it follows that dLY
d" ? 0 if ¾ Q 1.
Furthermore, equation (A.7) together with (A.10) shows that d·
d" > 0 if ¾ 6= 1. If
¾ = 1, then ± = 0 so dLY













d" in (A.5) and (A.6) gives the same results as
with expected privatisation.
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(1+ n)(1+ ¯ + °")
d"t +
°dy
1+ ¯ + °"
d"t+1:










¯(1+g)2(1+n)2¿g0 < 0(dueto AssumptionIII) and¢t ´ °dyd"t+1¡
(1+¯)do
1+n d"t. Because lY is a forward-looking variable and there is no backward-looking
variable in this economy, the solution of (A.11) results from iterating this equation
39forward. The state of the economy at time t can thus be written as a function of its
future state at time t+ s and all shocks between t¡ 1 and t +s,
dlY
t = ©sdlY





Letting s ! 1, the change in lY
t is written as a function of the change in its steady-
state value and all future shocks. For the steady-state equilibrium to be well-de…ned,
we therefore need to assume that j£j < 1. With assumption III, the assumption that
¯(1 + n)2(1 + g)2¿g0 > (1 + ¯ + °")(1 + g)2(1 + n) ¡ °"(1 ¡ ¿)rg0 assures that the
steady-state equilibrium is asymptotically stable. Then, the change in lY
t can merely
be written as a function of the sequence of exogenous future shocks,
dl
Y
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